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A Conceptual Understanding of Police Power in America
François DE SOETE*
I. Introduction
“I would like my books to be a kind of tool­box which others can rummage
through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area,”
Michel Foucault once said, adding that he writes “for users, not readers.”1)
Foucault’s work stemming from his genealogical approach to understanding the
history of the methods used to turn human beings into subjects has indeed proven
useful as a “tool­box” for scholars to apply to various socio­political inquiries.2) By
examining the micropractices employed in prisons and mental asylums, for example,
and analyzing how these practices were diffused more broadly into society, his
writings have helped reveal the inescapable nature of power relations that permeate
throughout all levels of society. These practices have ultimately led to a disciplinary
society in which, according to Foucault, power is based on subjection by means of
full visibility. “It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be
seen,” Foucault argues, “that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection.”3)
Policing has served as one of the primary mechanisms for enforcement for this
kind of disciplinary society that arose in modern western states according to
Foucault, and in order to exercise this disciplinary power, the police “had to be
given the instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of
making all visible, as long as it could itself remain invisible.”4) As Foucault puts it:
“police’s true object is man.”5) To that end, police officers are invested with an
exhaustive power of surveillance, and thus in effect, as this paper will argue while
focusing on the American context in particular, their function is similar to that of
the doctors in the asylum as described in Madness and Civilization and the guards
in the guard tower described in Discipline and Punish. Due in part to modern,
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organized police presence, American society at large has been transformed into a
panoptic schema, whereby policing keeps everyone disciplined in his or her own
subjection to the legal constructs by means of a panoptic network that coordinates
every police officer’s surveillance duties to span an entire city, an entire state, and
even the entire country.
The exercise of power by institutional forces over police officers, and the
subsequent exercise of police power over civilians, and the effects of these
occurrences qualify as the sort of capillary expressions of power that Foucault
sought to analyze,6) and a closer analysis of Foucault’s work reveals how police
power is both a function of the disciplinary society, and a key instrument for the
functioning of the disciplinary society.7) As this paper will demonstrate, it is possible
to extrapolate three components of disciplinary power that help explain the
theoretical nature of police power as it is exercised in the United States: 1.)
individualizing civilians; 2.) compulsory visibility and surveillance, and 3.) police
officers as experts. These aspects of police power make it possible for “the gaze” to
operate in public space by means of the panoptic network created by police
surveillance and the power of normalizing judgment, thus enabling police power to
generate self­monitoring law­abiding civilians based on the prevailing power­truth
dynamics operating in America. However, as will also be shown, the rise of social
media and seemingly omnipresent smartphone cameras are creating a situation
where the gaze now descends on police officers as well, and may thus be
transforming the nature of the police­civilian relationship.
II. Individualizing Civilians8)
According to Foucault, discipline “individualizes bodies by a location that does
not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network
of relations.”9) Such is the case with the distribution of civilians in metropolitan
areas in the United States, where those prone to criminal activity are largely
concentrated within specific neighborhoods, isolated from relatively crime­free
neighborhoods. It would not be unreasonable to project that a majority of criminals,
whose crimes may be attributed to the criminal’s economic circumstances, reside in
concentrated sectors within a given metropolitan area. One might further expect that
crimes against property (primarily theft and burglary) would be targeted against
affluent neighborhoods where its residents are wealthy, as the property stolen would
generally prove more lucrative to the criminal than property from areas lacking in
valuable goods. As such, criminals committing crimes against property, such as theft
and burglary, within their own residential areas would appear counter­intuitive.
Nonetheless, crimes against property, most notably theft and burglary, are far more
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frequent in lower­income neighborhoods. One reason for this trend is that
individuals from a lower income region are likely to be quickly noticed by police
officers in a wealthier area, and as such, they oftentimes remain within their own
neighborhoods.
The civilian who is out of place, as is the case with a lower income civilian in
a higher income neighborhood, is individualized the moment the police officer and
the civilian notice the presence of the other. Police officers will typically treat
civilians who cross into a wealthier part of a city as suspicious subjects, and they
may proceed to stop and interrogate such civilians. This process transforms civilians
from human beings as the totality of themselves as individuals, into cases marked
by their peculiarities in relation to the location in which they find themselves, and it
is at that moment that these civilians become suspects, both to the officer and to
themselves. “In a disciplinary régime,” Foucault suggests that “individualization is
descending,” and so those on whom power is “exercised tend to be more strongly
individualized.”10) When police officers approach a civilian, then that civilian must
cooperate with the officers, and in so doing that civilian affirms his or her status as
a suspect. The civilian has no other choice, for police officers not only have the
force of law on their side, but also the force of physical violence. If a civilian flees
from a police officer, that officer has essentially limitless resources to draw upon,
including additional police officers, and also has the authority to use physical force,
including lethal force.
In essence, police officers, if even but for a few fleeting moments, influence
the identity of the civilians with whom they interact by subjecting these people to
police authority and effectively forcing them to accept their status in relation to the
officer’s. This can leave a lasting impression insofar as even after an encounter with
police, a civilian knows that he or she is always potentially under observation, and
so the police may at any time be individualizing this civilian, unbeknownst to him
or her. As such, the civilian may come to internalize the individualization
experienced during his or her interactions with police, and so these brief moments
of interaction can leave a permanent impression on a civilian’s identity when out in
public. This kind of power creates a relationship between police and civilians during
moments of interaction parallel to that between the patient and doctor as discussed
in Madness and Civilization. 11) The police officer, like the doctor, examines the
civilian by means of interrogation or routine questioning. The police officer
individualizes the civilian, who is no longer a civilian during the period of
interaction with the officer, but is instead transformed into a suspect, witness, or
detainee, and the officer judges and classifies the civilian’s actions much like the
doctor individualizes a person as a patient or case and diagnoses the patient’s illness
based on an evaluation of his or her symptoms. This process is made possible in
Policing in the Modern Disciplinary Society １７
public spaces by means of compulsory visibility for civilians and the police’s
constant surveillance of public spaces, as discussed in the following section.
III. Compulsory Visibility and Surveillance12)
The police officer serves as an agent of the disciplinary society by enforcing
compulsory visibility of the general population, which according to Foucault, is a
central feature of disciplinary power. As Foucault puts it, disciplinary power
operates by means of its invisibility, while imposing “compulsory visibility” on
those who are the targets of this power.13) Foucault further notes that “it is the
subjects who have to be seen,” and their visibility “assures the hold of the power
that is exercised over them.”14) In other words, “it is the fact of being constantly
seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in
his subjection.”15) This kind of visibility is a central feature of modern policing.
Civilians must generally identify themselves to police if requested, often by
producing an identification document like a driver’s license or a government­issued
identification card. A civilian in a vehicle is easily identifiable by the vehicle’s
license plate. Technological advances have further enhanced the police’s ability to
make civilians visible at all times, with facial recognition software now making it
possible to identify civilians without their knowledge. Moreover, the vast network of
government security cameras, along with private security cameras that police can
access in the event of a crime, further reinforce the reality that civilians are visible
to the police in one way or another virtually anywhere, anytime. Police officers on
patrol also use “split­screen, multiphasic” mirrors, which provide nearly 180 degrees
of view range in an officer’s patrol car rear­view mirror.16) Perhaps most notably for
many civilians whose only encounters with law enforcement involves traffic matters,
the use of “radar guns” makes a civilian’s precise speed while driving visible to
police officers. Police officers even have computers built into patrol cars, which
enables them to enter a civilian’s name into its database and immediately access a
wide range of information about the individual in question, including outstanding
warrants and past arrests.
For police officers, on the other hand, they are only visible when they choose
to be. They operate both in stealth and in plain sight, which in combination
maximizes civilian awareness of being observed by the police. Examples of
operating in stealth to apprehend unsuspecting civilians include various undercover
operations such as police officers luring drug dealers to sell contraband in their
presence, or the use of “bait cars” to lure would­be car thieves to steal motor
vehicles in the presence of undercover police officers.17) At the same time, patrolling
in plain view reminds would­be criminals that police officers are present and ready
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to enforce the law. When officers do actually stop civilians for whatever reason,
ostentatious displays of flashing lights, sirens, and the gathering of multiple police
officers generates hyper­visibility of police presence. The knowledge that police
officers are always on patrol somewhere, and possibly unbeknownst to would­be
lawbreakers in their immediate vicinity, disciplines civilians into their own
subjection to the legal system. That is, the mere presence of a police officer
eliminates the element of choice for a would­be lawbreaker, and the reality that the
police may be watching even if they cannot be seen, and the awareness that a police
officer could appear without notice, can coerce civilians to obey the law.
The maximization of sudden and unpredictable police appearances deters
criminals from committing crimes, and so the scientific management of patrol
patterns has effectively maximized the number of police appearances throughout the
streets of a monitored area in a repetitive, yet unpredictable manner.18) Over the
course of the twentieth century crime control grew more concerned with the
temporal and spatial elements of crime, with an increasing focus on identifying
opportunities for crime, rather than on socio­economic or causal reasons for its
occurrence.19) Thus, police officers have largely focused on attempting to stop and
interrogate any “suspicious” individuals before any crime has taken place, with the
terms of suspicion dictated by the police officer. Correspondingly, a wave of police
reform during the 1960s in the United States led to a shift toward a proactive
approach, whereby “scientifically managed patrol patterns and coordinated action”
were implemented with the intention of preventing crime, as opposed to merely
responding to legal violations after the fact.20) Most notably, this meant restructuring
police departments, in terms of both organization and location within the patrol area,
to provide the shortest response times for automobile units.
This scientific police framework is clearly similar to the panoptic apparatus
discussed in Discipline and Punish, where power in the panopticon is found in the
“concerted distribution of bodies.”21) Panoptic schemas maximize visibility for the
authorities while they remain invisible to those they watch, until those authorities
choose to make themselves visible when admonishing someone who breaks the
rules. The structure Foucault describes is divided into individual cells on the
peripheral walls of the enclosure, with a centralized tower to monitor each and
every single cell. This results in a structure where there are “spatial unities that
make it possible to see constantly and recognize immediately.”22) The panoptic
model, according to Foucault, brings greater intensity and efficiency to the
mechanisms of power. Such is the case with the aforementioned policing methods,
where the coordination of police patrol patterns leads to synergy in surveillance.
That is, the coordinated patrol efforts together lead to a higher scope of surveillance
than the sum of each individual officer’s patrolling efforts.23) Computer software can
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even help the police predict where criminal activity is likely to occur from week to
week. One can thus see how the panoptic model reverberates in the proactive
approach to policing that emphasizes coordinated action and the scientific
management of patrol patterns.24)
This kind of panoptic arrangement is designed to prevent certain types of
actions, but it relies heavily on the self­monitoring that results. One can see a
parallel between civilians in public areas and prisoners in Foucault’s panopticon,
where both come to behave as required since they must assume that they may be
under observation at any time. Inmates in the panoptic prison, by virtue of their
inability to know whether or not they are being watched, grow to discipline
themselves.25) Similarly, civilians grow to discipline themselves as they are aware of
police surveillance, but cannot know whether or not an officer is watching. Routine
traffic enforcement serves as a good example, for civilians generally restrain their
speed while driving due to the knowledge that the police can “catch” them if they
go over the speed limit. The civilian rarely notices a police officer until he or she is
actually caught. This may lead the cited motorist to realize that he or she is unable
to detect police presence, and the other motorists who see another driver getting
“pulled over” develop a keen awareness that it could happen to them as well.
Motorists thus internalize the effects of this unidirectional exercise of police
surveillance, thereby resulting in motorists largely disciplining themselves much as
inmates do in the panopticon, which makes it possible for a relatively small number
of police officers to oversee a vast traffic network.
It is also necessary to consider the panoptic provisions for the supervision of
guards in the guard tower in order to fully explore the likeness of the relationship
between the police and civilians and the relationship between prison guards and
inmates. “The panopticon may even provide an apparatus for supervising its own
mechanisms,” Foucault notes, and in the central tower “the director may spy on all
the employees that he has under his orders … an inspector arriving unexpectedly at
the center of the Panopticon will be able to judge at a glance.”26) This has simply
not been the reality on the street for much of America’s history, for the gaze has not
been nearly as potent when applied to the gazers. While police officers have not
been able to obscure themselves entirely from the gaze, the gaze has not descended
on officers with the same degree of infiltration as it has for the average civilian
since police officers themselves have been primary agents for the gaze.
Thus, while civilians have grown to monitor themselves, police presence has
always served as the external element that reinforces this self­monitoring, while
police officers have themselves remained largely free from the gaze. This is clearly
changing, however, with social media and the very real possibility of civilians
capturing incidents on video on their smartphones. The rise of social media now
François DE SOETE２０
makes it so that civilians can coordinate in ways that only the police once could,
particularly when initiating social demonstrations and protests, and even riots, where
civilians can coordinate and centralize in certain locations so as to overwhelm the
police’s ability to monitor and individualize civilians. Police officers must also now
face the reality of constantly being monitored, actively under surveillance by means
of possibly being recorded at any time. Their ability to shape the truth of incidents
solely based on their accounts of events is therefore no longer guaranteed since
anyone at any time may have incontrovertible video evidence of what actually
happened in any given police­civilian incident. As such, the ubiquitous nature of
smartphones today may be instituting a new gaze, for both civilians and the police
alike, thereby displacing the police from the guard tower in this metaphorical street
panopticon.
IV. Police Officers as Experts27)
As the volume of reported crime increased in the United States throughout the
twentieth century, police officers needed to become more autonomous, and needed
to exercise more discretion in deciding against whom charges were most warranted,
and when it was more appropriate to issue mere warnings. The parameters through
which police officers exercise their power have also expanded, for the increase in
punishable infractions is partly responsible for the increase in reported crime over
the course of the twentieth century. More and more laws have been passed, which
has increased the number of possible statutory violations that police officers can
uncover. At the same time, with so many possible criminal violations and
potentially overwhelming case loads,28) police officers have had to choose, based on
the nature of the offense and the offender, which circumstances warrant formal
citations or arrest, and which circumstances are best addressed with informal
measures like a warning.29) As Peter Scharf and Arnold Binder write, “street police
work demands great organizational autonomy for its operatives (from patrol officers
to commanders to detectives) … mostly with little direct supervision.”30) This
expansion of discretionary decision­making, along with the principle of qualified
immunity, has essentially granted police officers the power to make judgments,
much in the same way that the doctor judges a patient in the asylum as Foucault
describes in Madness and Civilization. 31) The police officer evaluates events and
determines whether or not an offense has taken place, and this can be as simple as
judging whether or not a motorist has made a complete stop at a posted stop sign or
who has committed a random assault in a thick crowd of people. As such, police
officers exercise a power that renders their testimony a piece of factual evidence:
police officers exercise a power of testimonial truth.
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Police officers today are trained extensively and undergo rigorous testing to
verify their abilties and their moral qualifications. Just as science has legitimized the
medical knowledge of the doctor, as Foucault suggests in Madness and
Civilization, 32) these processes discipline police trainees and produce police officers
as certified experts, which legitimizes police judgment.33) These scientific training
regimens may thus be at least partly responsible for the discourse that reinforces the
police’s belief in an officer’s infallibility of judgment and creates obedience within
the ranks. Beyond this, these processes create police officers whose training is seen
to render them experts of justice, because the scientific process putatively verifies
officers’ moral qualifications.34) Coupled with the training that police officers
receive, which instructs them in lie detection and proactive crime prevention, an
officer’s testimony regarding a civilian’s alleged criminal or civil violation is able to
withstand intense scrutiny by lawyers in the courtroom.35)
Since police officers have long carried automatic legitimacy in the courtroom,
civilians may be subject to something similar to absolute control in one­on­one
situations, for an officer can later give testimony in a manner that suggests his or
her actions were lawful. The officers in the famous 1991 Rodney King case claimed
that the suspect was resisting arrest in response to a video that surfaced showing
them beating King during a traffic stop. Yet, as the tape reveals, it appears that
King could not seriously pose a threat to the group of Los Angeles police officers
that were clubbing him—and despite the video evidence the officers were absolved
of criminal charges.36) Recent events are changing this situation, as discussed in the
previous section, but it is clear that historically police testimony has been taken as
fact. Quite simply, if a police officer falsely claims that a civilian failed to stop at a
red light, whether this claim is maliciously fabricated or reached in error, that
civilian cannot possibly hope to challenge the officer’s account. Similarly, police
officers who are certain of an individual’s criminality can fabricate and plant
evidence to secure convictions, as is the case with “dropsy” testimony, which is
when officers claim that a suspect dropped or threw away incriminating items in the
officer’s presence.37)
Civilians are legally obligated to obey legitimate police commands, which
strengthens the control that police officers exert over civilians in one­on­one
situations, especially since officers can exercise their own discretion in defining
what constitutes a legitimate command. This means that when a civilian spots the
flashing blue and red lights in his or her rear view mirror, the individual is legally
required to pull over and place himself or herself under the authority of what
amounts to a complete stranger, differentiated primarily by a badge and a firearm. In
most instances, the officer will not injure or harm the civilian involved, but whether
or not the officer violates a civilian’s rights is largely out of the civilian’s control.
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Due to the background checks police officers undergo and the training they receive,
society entrusts police officers to establish truth regarding events and the people
involved. However, many attorneys believe that some police officers get away with
perjury since society presumes that police officers operate under higher moral
standards than the typical civilian.38) The end product in American police work
today, then, is a situation described by Jerome Skolnick as a situation where the
police administer “justice without trial.”39)
Police regulation has instead relied heavily on internal monitoring, which has
obviously been problematic. “One major factor that perpetuates police misconduct is
the set of unwritten rules that is tacitly supported by many police officers,”
according to Dean Champion, and “these unwritten rules encourage officers not to
betray other officers whenever misconduct is discovered or witnessed.”40) Due to
what is often referred to as the “blue wall of silence,”41) police officers in the United
States have not had to experience the kind of external monitoring that effectively
reinforces self­monitoring, evidenced by the infrequent conviction rate of police
officers accused of misconduct, unlike civilians who grow to monitor themselves
based on their awareness of potential police presence. As Ian Loader notes, “the
police’s entitlement and capacity to speak about the world is seldom challenged.”42)
As such, a police officer’s claim tends to be treated as fact, for it finds support from
the police department and the legitimacy it carries. Efforts to ebb such increasingly
independent power are often resisted not by one, but by most officers due to a
“pride in the cloth … ‘police family’ mindset.”43) This therefore presents a classic
problem where the police watch over civilians, but have no effective external
agency actively watching over the police, which begs the question: quis custodiet
ipsos custodes?—“who will guard the guardians.”44) When an officer is alone with a
civilian, that civilian can only hope to challenge false police testimony against him
or her in the courtroom if the incident is captured on video, which may ultimately
still prove futile.
The fatal beating of forty­one year old Nathanial Jones in November of 2003
illustrates this point. Close­up video footage clearly displays six police officers
repeatedly beating Jones while he was attempting to surrender outside of a
Cincinnati, Ohio, fast­food restaurant. Despite what appears to be excessive force,
the chief of police, the mayor, and the president of the Cincinnati chapter of The
Fraternal Order of Police at the time all defended the conduct of the officers.45) Such
examples, where misconduct is actually captured on video and police officials
remain steadfast in defending their officers’ conduct, demonstrates a strong internal
discourse of police accounts as unquestionable truth. The high­profile case of
George Floyd in May of 2020, however, may represent a clash of cultures. On the
one hand, the fact that one police officer knelt on Floyd’s neck without the other
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three police officers intervening, despite Floyd’s repeated statements that he was
unable to breathe, seemingly shows this police culture of solidarity at work. On the
other hand, the swift public reactions and arrest of the officers seemingly reveals a
political culture that is no longer willing to simply accept police judgments at face
value.
Ultimately, this aspect of policing that posits police officers as experts whose
testimony is treated as truth has allowed police officers to operate with two forms of
authority: de jure, which refers to a police officer’s legally endowed powers, and de
facto, which refers to the actual use of police power. The interaction between
civilians and police officers involves the use of police power in both forms, which
are in many ways strongly interrelated, for the de jure power held by police officers
in the courtroom influences the de facto power they exercise in the field. If an
officer’s testimony is presumed true in the courtroom, then the officer can shape his
or her account of particular incidents in a manner that leads a court to consider the
officer’s actions to be in accordance with the law. Consequently, police power in
the court defines its power in the field, since one of the strongest legal powers
granted to a police officer is the use of discretion, which can thus make a police
officer’s de facto power legal. A police officer’s authority is supposed to be an
executive function, but as John Kleinig puts it, “discretionary decision making by
police might be interpreted as a form of legislative activity.”46) Police de facto
authority, then, can actually be rendered de jure authority as well, for an officer’s
judgment normalizes, which enables the officer to make his or her judgments legally
correct. Nikolas Rose, drawing on Foucault, also suggests that police officers
exercise a power of normalizing judgment.47) Rose’s analysis reinforces the
suggestion that police officers are technical experts sanctioned to determine an
individual’s criminal capacity and as such, stand as agents of the disciplinary
operations in society. Police power has become “the power of legitimate
pronouncement,” Loader summarizes, adding that it is “a power to diagnose,
classify, authorize, and represent both individuals and the world, and to have this
power of ‘legitimate naming’ not just taken seriously, but taken for granted.”48)
Several recent high­profile instances of police officers using lethal force against
African American men like George Floyd and the swift public and legal reprisal,
however, indicates that this facet of police power, where police judgment is taken as
truth, may be on the cusp of a profound transformation.
V. Conclusion
Foucault’s study of the modern expressions of power that constitute what he
calls a new ‘micro­physics’ of power,49) exemplified by the panopticon described in
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Foucault’s Discipline and Punish and the doctor­patient relationship articulated in
Madness and Civilization, offers unique insight into the nature of police power vis­à
­vis its exercise on the street. As the micro­techniques of power that developed in
settings like prisons and hospitals were decentralized from these institutions, they
expanded throughout society at large. On the streets, outside of the prison and the
asylum, police officers operate like the wardens and doctors Foucault describes, by
observing civilians closely to ensure that the panoptic mechanisms remain in place
at all levels. The most efficient behavior for street life, just as the most efficient
behavior inside the prison, is shaped on the street through discipline. In the case of
police power, this comes in the form of actions like arrests, citations, and warnings.
This results in large­scale obedience to the law, and an efficient, and largely safer,
public life and traffic system. Police officers, as a result of their training and a legal
framework that holds their judgment as more credible than that of civilians, become
experts in the endeavor to create structured public life. What an officer believes
happened in confrontations involving civilians is thus effectively rendered true. In
this way, then, police officers also function like wardens and doctors as a result of
their exercise of normalizing judgment over civilians.
Applying a perspective based on some of Foucault’s insights to policing in the
United States can help lead to a better conceptual understanding of how law
enforcement functions, but it does not directly address some of the serious criticisms
relating to instances of police brutality, excessive force, unwarranted lethal force,
and issues of the disparate impact of such abuses along racial lines. Part of the
reason for this is that one of Foucault’s central tenets in his studies is to suspend or
“bracket” normative judgments. Since power is a relation between everyone at every
level of society and is thus not state­centered, according to Foucault, “the classical
liberal normative contrast between legitimate and illegitimate power is inadequate to
the nature of modern power” and as such has to be suspended.50) This has led some
of his critics, including Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas, and Nancy Fraser to
contend that Foucault paradoxically stresses the importance of resistance, despite
lacking the normative framework needed to justify such resistance.51) As Habermas
notably put it, Foucault fails to answer why we should “muster any resistance at all
against this all­pervasive power … instead of just adapting ourselves to it.”52) Why
then should one apply a Foucaultian analysis if it lacks the normative criteria
necessary to animate a reaction to the subject matter under consideration?
While an approach based on the selection of Foucault’s insights presented here
is not geared toward directly challenging police abuses or toward confronting the
frequency of such instances, this does not mean that it lacks a prescriptive quality.
Rather than focusing on “why” struggle, a Foucaultian approach as formulated here
instead focuses on “what,” as in, struggle against what? In the context of law
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enforcement in America, police reform is one of the most pressing topics today,
especially in the context of the disparate impacts along racial lines. Much of the
discussion focuses on making sure to equip police officers with bodycams, racial
sensitivity training, diversifying police forces, and implementing new regulations
regarding the use of deadly force. While such measures can undoubtedly help
minimize the risk of police officers using excessive force or unwarranted lethal
force, such measures do not fully address the more fundamental aspect of policing
in America that should at the least be questioned and discussed continually: the
dynamic between truth and power operating in American legal frameworks, and the
way that policing normalizes the self­regulating law­abiding individual in
accordance with this dynamic.
As such, questions relating to the specifics of changing police practices in order
to prevent abuse, and how to make such changes, is not only beyond the scope of
this kind of analysis, but also beside the point. “The work of an intellectual is not to
form the political will of others,” according to Foucault, but rather, “it is, through
the analyses that he carries out in his own field, to bring assumptions and things
taken for granted again into question … to dispel the familiarity of the accepted.”53)
Foucault’s work indicates that the purpose of struggling is for, as Leslie Paul Thiele
puts it, the “perpetuation and amelioration of the conditions that make struggle itself
possible.”54) As such, getting back to the question of Foucault’s lack of normative
criteria, a Foucaultian analysis need not focus on struggling against the exercise of
police power in America, but rather, the taken­for­granted nature of policing itself in
conceptual terms. This means that a Foucaultian analysis as presented here is geared
toward not allowing the taken­for­granted nature of policing in the United States to
become so entrenched that people cannot even imagine an America without policing
as it is instituted now. With law enforcement now seemingly entering a
transformative period in the United States, where the effects of ubiquitous
smartphone cameras and the rise of social media are beginning to re­shape the
police­civilian relationship, and where the death of George Floyd is bringing racial
justice issues vis­à­vis policing to the forefront of society, an analysis that considers
the nature of police power as a function of the disciplinary society and the effects of
its normalizing judgments on civilians therefore seems as timely as ever.
Notes
1 ) Michel Foucault, “Prisons et asiles dans le mécanisme du pouvoir,” in Dits Ecrits Tome II,
1974, pp.523­524. (Cited in Clare O’Farrell, Michel Foucault, London: Sage Publications,
2005.)
2 ) Michel Foucault, “Afterword: The Subject and Power,” in H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (eds.)
François DE SOETE２６
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1983), p.208.
3 ) Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books,
1977), p.187.
4 ) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.214.
5 ) Michel Foucault, “Omnes et Signulatim: Towards a Criticism of ‘Political Reason,’” in S.
McMurrin (ed.) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol.II, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), p.248.
6 ) Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in C. Gordon (ed.) Power/Knowledge (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1980), p.97.
7 ) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.213.
8 ) This section is revised and edited from “Foucault’s Perspective” in Francois de Soete, “To
Protect and Serve? A Conceptual Investigation into the Extremes of Police Power”
(Master’s Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2004), pp.19­23.
9 ) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.146.
10) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 145.
11) Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans.
Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p.276.
12) This section is revised, edited, and updated from “Foucault’s Perspective” in Francois de
Soete, “To Protect and Serve? A Conceptual Investigation into the Extremes of Police
Power” (Master’s Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2004), pp.10­16.
13) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.187.
14) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.187.
15) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.187.
16) Christopher Pierce Wilson, Cop knowledge: Police Power and Cultural Narrative in
Twentieth-Century America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p.96.
17) R. Blecker, “Policing the Police,” in D. J. Kenney (ed.) Police and Policing: Contemporary
Issues (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), p.176.
18) Wilson, Cop Knowledge, p.95.
19) Pat O’Malley, “Risk and Responsibility,” in A. Barry et al. (eds.) Foucault and Political
Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p.187.
20) Wilson, Cop Knowledge, p.95.
21) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.202.
22) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.200.
23) Wilson, Cop Knowledge, p.96.
24) Wilson, Cop Knowledge, p.95.
25) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.173.
26) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.204.
27) This section is revised, edited, and updated from “Foucault’s Perspective” in Francois de
Soete, “To Protect and Serve? A Conceptual Investigation into the Extremes of Police
Power” (Master’s Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2004), pp.23­33.
28) David Garland, “The Limits of the Sovereign State,” British Journal of Criminology, 36:4
(1996), p.456.
Policing in the Modern Disciplinary Society ２７
29) Dennis P. Forcese, D. Horne, and N. Lewis­Horne, “Big Policing,” in D.P. Forcese (ed.)
Police: Selected Issues in Canadian Law Enforcement, (Ottawa: The Golden Dog Press,
2002), p.65.
30) Peter Scharf and Arnold Binder, The Badge and the Bullet: Police Use of Deadly Force
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p.184.
31) Foucault, Madness and Civilization, p.160.
32) Foucault, Madness and Civilization, p.183.
33) R. Bing and V. McLaughlin, “Selection, Training, and Discipline of Police Officers,” in D.
J. Kenney (ed.) Police and Policing: Contemporary Issues (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1989), p.29.
34) Bing and McLaughlin, Selection, Training, and Discipline, p.35.
35) R. Inwald, R. and D. J. Kenney, “Psychological Testing of Police Candidates,” in D. J.
Kenney (ed.) Police and Policing: Contemporary Issues (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1989), p.36.
36) C.J. Ogletree, Jr., M. Prosser, A. Smith, and & W. Talley, Jr., Beyond the Rodney King
Story: An Investigation of Police Conduct in Minority Communities (Boston: Northeastern
University Press, 1995), p.4.
37) Dean J. Champion, Police Misconduct in America: A Reference Handbook. (Santa Barbara:
ABC Clio, 2001), p.49.
38) Champion, Police Misconduct in America, p.49.
39) Jerome Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society (Toronto:
Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1994), p.14.
40) Champion, Police Misconduct in America, p.18.
41) Champion, Police Misconduct in America, p.27.
42) Ian Loader, “Policing and the Social: Questions of Symbolic Power,” British Journal of
Sociology, 48 (1997), p.3.
43) Christopher Braiden, “Policing: From the Belly of the Whale,” in R. C. Macleod & D.
Schneiderman (eds.) Police Powers in Canada: The Evolution and Practice of Authority
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p.330.
44) René J. Marin, Policing in Canada: Issues for the 21st Century (Aurora, Ontario: Canada
Law Books Inc., 1997), p.47.
45) CNN, “Coroner: Man had Enlarged Heart, Drugs in System,” CNN, December 2, 2003,
https://edition.cnn.com/ 2003/US/Midwest/12/01/died.in.custody/index.html.
46) John Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.89.
47) Nikolas Rose, “Governing ‘Advanced’ Liberal Democracies, in A. Barry et al. (eds.)
Foucault and Political Reason, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p.46.
48) Loader, Policing and the Social, p.3.
49) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.29.
50) Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social
Theory (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p.26.
51) Fraser, Unruly Practices, 17­34.
52) Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1996), p.283.
François DE SOETE２８
53) Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984,
ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (London: Routledge, 1988), p.265.
54) Leslie Paul Thiele, “The Agony of Politics: The Nietzschean Roots of Foucault’s Thought,”
The American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), p.918.
Policing in the Modern Disciplinary Society ２９
